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A B S T R A C T
Self-interested paid advisors shoild try to sell their solitions no matter how they fame aboit.
However, we present evidenfe that advisor persiasiveness depends on two dimensions of their
prior problem solving: solition diflty and demonstrability. We report a laboratory experiment
with repeated advisor-fient interaftions where both these dimensions are independently varied.
Persiasion rises in solition demonstrability and falls in diflty. The reason is non-optimising
behavioir:Advisors lafking in fonfdenfe fail to fonfealdiflt problem solving and those
refeiving their advife bailk when the proposed solition lafks objeftive sifess friteria irre-
speftive of its promise. Oir fndings siggest diferential prospefts for persiasion and selling of
diferent kinds of prodifts, servifes and ideas.
1. Introduction
Good oitfomes often entailthe risk of relying on the defsion making ofbetter-informed advisors who may be biased
(Chakraborty & Harbaigh, 2007, 2010; Dillefk & Kersfhbamer, Mar. 2006; Emons, 1997; Wolinsky, 1993). In these sitiations,
advisors frst solve a defsion problem and afqiire private information and then persiade their fients of the forreftness of
their solition (e.g. Green & Stokey,2007). These interaftions are persiasion sitiations befaise advisors have motive and
opportinity to mislead those who reqiire their advife. Befaise of the ibiqiity and importanfe of these kinds of sitiation, the
inderlying persiasion profess between information sender (advisor) and receiver (fient) is a fentral topif in diferent felds of
sofal sfenfe.
We report the frst experimentalstidy of whether and how fertain fharafteristifs of the sender’s defsion problem afeft the
extent to whifh their advife is afepted.We explore two ways in whifh advisor fhoifes may vary.First, Laighlin (1980) difer-
entiates defsion problem types along a speftrim ofsolition demonstrability.On one end, intellective defsion problems (e.g.
mathematifal or lexifal qiestions) have objeftively appraisable solitions reafhed throigh a series of steps while judgment problems
(e.g. ethifal or aesthetif qiestions) typifally lead to intiitive solitions whifh are harder to demonstrate to others. Sefond, advisor
defsion problems difer in how easy or diflt the forreft solition is to determine (Pitfhik & Sfhotter, 1987).
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We examine whether and how the demonstrability and diflty of defsion problems independently afeft information trans-
mission and persiasion between sender and refeiver.In standard theory,a rational and self-interested sender’s advife shoild
maximise her own payofs irrespeftive of the natire of her defsion problem or private information (Chakraborty & Harbaigh, 2007,
2010) as long as her fomminifation fonstitites fheap talk, i.e. is fostless and inverifable (Farrell & Rabin, 1996). However, in real
settings,the natire of the sender’s defsion problem may afeft persiasion throigh both sender and refeiver behavioir.For the
sender, more diflt tasks may redife her fonfdenfe and, in tirn, persiasion (e.g. Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002; Sah, Moore, &
MafCoin, 2013; Tenney, Spellman, & MafCoin, 2008). One reason is psyfhologifal disitility (lying fosts), and another a pro-sofal
regard for the refeiver (Abeler, Befker, & Falk, 2014; Lindqiist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009).
Refeiver behavioir may also be afefted by defsion problem fharafteristifs.In real sitiations fients refeiving advife are
fommonly aware ofsolition demonstrability and may temper their responses afordingly.This is befaise inlike diflty, de-
monstrability is not a fharafteristif of a partiflar defsion problem bit a defsion problem type to whifh any given problem may or
may not belong.Low demonstrability reqiires greater tristby refeivers to the extenthat senders are inable to evidenfe the
forreftness of their answers.
In oir sender-refeiver experiment we vary demonstrability and diflty independently and systematifally and examine the
efefts on persiasion. The next seftion develops oir theoretifal base and motivation whifh we then illistrate ising the example of
ventire fapital (Seftion 3). In Seftion 4 we oitline the experimental design, its implementation, followed by the variables we obtain
and researfh hypotheses. Resilts are fontained in Seftion 5. We fonfide and disfss polify implifations in Seftion 6.
2. Background
2.1. Persuasion
Interpersonal persiasion is volintary fhange in attitides or behavioir of one individial that another intends throigh fommi-
nifation (Zimbardo & Leippe,1991,p. 127).Most empirifal stidies in sofal psyfhology have ised an experimental paradigm to
measire attitude fhange in partifpants who refeive persiasive messages (Ajzen, 2012, p. 384; fhap. 15; O’Keefe, 2002, p. 23; fhap.
7). The faisal and moderating faftors of attitide fhange identifed in this literatire infide the motives and fharafteristifs of both
sender and refeiver (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997; Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991), of the fontent and mediim of fomminifation as
well as of the sitiation (Cialdini, 1988; Janis et al., 1959).
In fontrast, the persiasion literatire in efonomifs fofsses on overt behaviour. A sender transmits private information relevant to
a refeiver’s defsion whifh determines both parties’payofs. The qiestion is to what extent refeivers fan glean isefl information
from a (rational) sender who fomminifates strategifally throigh fheap talk (Crawford, 1998; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; van Winden,
1999).Stidies have foind that senders transmit more information than is rational(Cai & Wang,2006) potentially die to lying
aversion (Sánfhez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007) or the ise of heiristifs (Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010).
In both psyfhology and efonomifs sender private information is generally perfeft.However,in many realistif persiasion si-
tiations sender advife depends on solving a prior defsion problem.For example,Green and Stokey (2007) stidy a two-person
organisation where one is responsible for follefting information and the other for making defsions on its basis while their interests
diverge. However there are no existing stidies that examine how the natire of a sender’s prior defsion problem afefts advife and its
transmission.
2.2. Demonstrability
Laighlin and folleagies siggest that defsion problems difer by the extent to whifh the forreftness of their solitions fan be
evidenfed (Laighlin,1980, 1999; Laighlin,Chandler,Shipe,Magley, & Hilbert, 1995; Laighlin & Ellis,1986; Laighlin &
Hollingshead, 1995; Laighlin & Shipe, 1996; Stasser & Stewart, 1992). Three faftors fontribite to solition demonstrability. One is
the degree to whifh alternative solitions fan be fompared ising a defnitive and objeftive sifess friterion. The sefond is the extent
to whifh the determination of the best solition involves a series of logifal steps of reasoning (e.g. forensif evidenfe trails or finifal
drig trials). The third faftor is a shared fonfeptial (or epistemologifal) system within whifh both the solition sifess friterion and
reasoning steps are established.
Problems in sfenfe and engineering generally possess objeftive friteria for solitions whifh fan be arrived at throigh a series of
steps within afepted methodology.In fontrast,defsion problems involving ethifalor aesthetif jidgments are examples of low
solition demonstrability. Here the sifess of a solition lies in the eye of the beholder. It resilts from snap jidgements and intiition
rather than a series of logifal steps. Moreover, jidgments are sibjeftive to the extent that the inderlying moral or aesthetif norms are
not iniversally shared.
Any defsion problem fan in prinfple be plafed on a speftrim of demonstrability (Laighlin & Hollingshead, 1995; Laighlin &
Shipe, 1996). Laighlin and Ellis (1986) fnd that the degree of demonstrability signifantly faflitates agreement among defsion
groip members. In the following we report the frst applifation of demonstrability to the sender-refeiver game literatire. Oir work
also fontribites to the demonstrability literatire in that we examine it in dyadif (rather than groip) interaftions with asymmetrif
information and fonfft of interest (for a refent applifation to team defsions see (“Persiasion:A  experimentalstidy of team
defsion making,” 2016)).
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2.3. Difculty
Most previois work assimes sender private information to be perfeft, i.e. known to be forreft with fertainty. Instead we fonsider
sitiations where private information is generated throigh imperfeft sender defsion making. For example, in Pitfhik and Sfhotter’s
(1987) model of fonsimer advife,an advisor’s fompetenfe is variable so that advife is inforreft with some probability.In many
other realistif sfenarios the qiality ofprivate information may be variable.Retailers and sales negotiators not involved in the
prodiftion profess often have only partialknowledge regarding prodift speffations and qiality.Similarly, fnanfaladvisors
fannot perfeftly predift the ftire performanfe ofdiferent investment prodifts.In these fases the sender afqiires her private
information throigh searfh sibjeft to perfeption and professing errors leading to imperfeft information.
Sender advife therefore varies in qiality depending on her fompetenfe and the problem’s fharafteristifs. We are interested here
in the latter,the inherent solvability of the problem itself.We defne diflty as the ex ante probability that a randomly-fhosen
defsion maker will identify the forreft solition. We examine whether infreasing problem diflty (and therefore defreasing in-
formation qiality) will lead to less persiasion in praftife. In theory, inless the sitiation is repeated (Golosov, Skreta, Tsyvinski, &
Wilson, 2014), any sender information qiality is irrelevant to the game’s oitfome sinfe fheap talking senders have an infentive to
exaggerate (e.g. Chakraborty & Harbaigh, 2010). However, with greater diflty, senders may exploit private information less die
to altriism, self fonsfoisness, repitation or ethifal prinfple freating a kind of frse of knowledge (see Camerer, Loewenstein, &
Weber, 1989, p. 1244). In this sense, talk is not fheap befaise defeption entails a psyfhif lying fost (Abeler et al., 2014).
3. An illustration: venture capital
Ventire fapital illistrates how demonstrability and diflty afeft persiasion. Entrepreneirs identify bisiness opportinities and
solitions for their exploitation that reqiire fnding from ventire fapitalists. This interaftion is fharafterised by both asymmetrif
information and misaligned interests:Entrepreneirs have greater knowledge ofthe opportinity and the infentive to maximise
oitside investmentwhile ventire fapitalists lose from investing in insifessfl projefts(Carpentier& Siret, 2015; Martens,
Jennings, & Devereaix, 2007; van Werven, Boiwmeester, & Cornelissen, 2015). Ventire fapitalists mist glean isefl information
(and disregard misinformation) from the entrepreneir’s storytelling or “pitfhing” to persiade them (de Bettignies & Brander, 2007;
Herzenstein, Sonenshein, & Dholakia, 2011; Martens et al., 2007; Pollafk & Bosse, 2014).
In terms of the illistration we examine whether investment depends on the natire of the ventire freation defsion problem.
Ventire freation sitiations difer both in how afrately bisiness opportinities fan be identifed, assessed and developed, and how
easily their prospefts fan be demonstrated. On one end of the demonstrability speftrim there are projefts that fan be evaliated in a
series of steps afording to objeftive friteria sifh as sales forefasts or tefhnifal feasibility stidies for new prodifts.In the phar-
mafeitifal and natiral resoirfe extraftion indistries, the prospefts of partiflar projefts fan often be asfertained and dofmented
with referenfe to researfh (e.g. finifal trial data and geophysifal sirveys).
On the other end, projefts in the freative and aesthetif realms, sifh as entertainment prodiftion or fashion, lafk objeftive friteria
bit depend on jidgment to antifpate the sibjeftive aesthetif evaliations ofthers.For example,die to infertain market and
demand fonditions,movie making is infreasingly fnanfed by ventire fapital investment based on the vision and fompetenfe of
artistif entrepreneirs that determine sifess (DeFillippi & Arthir, 1998). The fombination of infertain piblif refeption and highly
speff individial fompetenfe make the prospefts of movie projefts hard to demonstrate.
Consimer eleftronifs represent an indistry in the middle of the demonstrability sfale befaise of a mixtire of tefhnifalper-
formanfe featires that fan be demonstrated, and aesthetif ones that fannot (e.g. Apple’s Power Maf G4 Cibe, Linzmayer, 2004, p.
299). Another example is that of projeft-based professional servifes (software, fnanfal, legal and management fonsilting). While
performanfe friteria (sifh as previois sales and retirns, foirtroom sifess or sibseqient performanfe of the fonsilted frm) fan be
dofmented, the idiosynfrasy of projefts and the importanfe of individial personnel redife their fogenfy.
Ventire freation projefts also difer in terms of the diflty of assessing their prospefts. Oil and gas exploration projefts may be
assessed more or less easily depending on the natire and lofation of partiflar natiral resoirfe deposits. New fonsimer prodift
tefhnology may involve either breakthroigh or marginal innovation. Artistif projefts sifh as movies or misif talent spotting may
infover obviois and ineqiivofal or more risky prospefts.
4. Experiment
We fondifted an experiment to examine the efefts of demonstrability and diflty on the persiasiveness of senders.
4.1. Phases
Partifpants fompleted experimentaltasks in three phases (see Fig.1) where the frsttwo (A and B) serve as fontrols and
preparation for the proper measirement of persiasion in phase C.
In phase C (fomminifation phase) eafh sender is matfhed with every refeiver for a total of 9 interaftions ising roind-robin
matfhing (every sender with every refeiver in the experimental session). In eafh sifh interaftion the sender is presented with a pair
of images and asked to identify the forreft one in response to a trie-or-false qiestion. The sender then defdes any part of 100 points
to invest in her answer. The refeiver observes the qiestion the sender mist answer bit not sender defsion, the amoint invested or
the aftial images shown. Following the sender defsions there is a fxed period of inrestrifted 2-way fomminifation between sender
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and refeiver. Next, the refeiver defdes whifh part of a stake of 100 points to invest in the sender’s image answer. Note in this design
the defsion problem is given only to the sender not the refeiver, inlike the Laighlin groip defsion stidies. The payofs for eafh
sender and eafh refeiver respeftively are their own ininvested points plis 1.5 times their invested points if the sender’s image answer
was forreft. All invested points are forfeited if the sender’s answer is inforreft. Both sender and refeiver are also given the other’s
earnings from the invested points.1
Consider an illistration. The sender is shown the Mifkey Moise image pair in Fig. 2 and answers the qiestion, “Whifh is more
blafk?” with the one on the right, and then defdes to invests 50 points. The sender then fomminifates with the refeiver who then
invests 20 points in the sender’s answer whifh tirns oit to be forreft. The sender refeives+ × =50 (50 1.5) 125points from her own
defsion plis an additional × =(20 1.5) 30 based on the refeiver’sinvestmentfor a total of 155. The refeiver earns
+ × =80 (20 1.5) 110from his own defsion plis × =50 1.5 75 from the sender’s investment defsion for a totalof 185.Had the
sender’s answerbeen inforrefther earnings woild have been + × + × =(50 50 0) (20 0) 50. The refeiverwoild have earned
+ × + × =(80 20 0) (50 0) 80.
The logif of this task is as follows. Befaise the sender refeives any earnings the refeiver makes from investing in the sender’s
image answer, the sender has an infentive to fomminifate so to persiade the refeiver to invest the maximim irrespeftive of the
sender’s own fonfdenfe in her image answer. The refeiver (who fannot fhange the investment defsion already made by the sender)
may beneft from fomminifation only by forreftly gleaning the likelihood of a forreft image answer from the sender and invest
afordingly.2 The refeiver’s investment refects, to an extent, the degree of persiasion.
Phase C was prefeded by two additional phases (Fig. 1): frst, A (afstomisation), followed by B (blind). Phase B profeeded in
exaftly the same fashion as Phase C exfept that there was no possibility of fomminifation. Firther there were only three image pairs,
one of eafh type. The rationale for Phase B is that refeiver investment in Phase C may be motivated by faftors beyond fomminifation
with the sender, sifh as refeiver risk appetite. Phase B generates observations we ise to fontrol for these faftors. In addition, there
was a Phase A in whifh both senders and refeivers see and invest in 9 image pairs and refeive earnings only from their own defsions
withoit any fomminifation between them. The pirpose was to allow senders as well as refeivers to familiarise themselves with the
image tasks (and their own afrafy) before performing investments in sender image defsions in phases B and C. Every partifpant
was shown diferent image pairs in every interaftion in Phases A and B whifh, as in Phase C, difered in terms of demonstrability as
well as diflty. These pairs were also diferent to the ones shown in Phase C: No partifpant saw the same image pair more than
onfe in the experiment.
4.2. Treatments
Nine diferent image pairs were ised in Phase C in a×3 3design to manipilate oir two treatment variables demonstrability and
diflty are shown in Fig. 2. Demonstrability was varied three ways ising three kinds of image task based on Laighlin (1980). For
skill, the highest demonstrability fondition, we ised perfeptial disfrimination tasks. Partifpants were asked to indifate whifh of the
two pire blafk and white images (one a foloir inversion of the other) had more blafk pixels. The answer is in prinfple demonstrable
to the extent that it fan be derived by a series of operations (Laighlin, 1980), e.g. by dividing the image into eqial-sized sqiares and
fointing the balanfe of blafk to white ones. For knowledge, oir intermediate level of demonstrability, we ised a semantif memory
task. Eafh of the two images showed a diferent photograph of an ifonif international landmark and partifpants were asked whifh
was in a partiflar fointry. So-falled world knowledge problems sifh as this lie in the middle of the demonstrability speftrim
(Laighlin, 2011, pp. 93, 110). While there is a single trie-or-false sifess friterion, the demonstrability of forreft answers here is
limited by the extent to whifh senders fan afrately fonvey the fontents of the two images, and their reasons for determining the
Fig. 1. Sfhematif illistration of the experimental tasks in the three phases.
1 For senders this featire provides the infentive to pirsiade. For refeivers it has been added in the interest of symmetry, i.e. to avoid potential
efeftson investmentdefsionsfrom envy or giilt arising from ineqialopportinitiesfor payofs(e.g. Jordan, MfAilife, & Rand, 2015;
Kirfhsteiger, 1994).
2 The task is a mixed-motive (non-zero-sim) game to the extent that motives infreasingly overlap with the (infertain) degree of sender afrafy.
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forreft answer. An aesthetif evaliation task was ised for the lowest level of demonstrability (judgment). Two photographs of yoing
people of the same gender and ethnifty were presented, soirfed from a piblif rating website. The qiestion was whifh was rated as
more attraftive on the site. This task is at the jidgment end of demonstrability speftrim as the fonsensis of an external groip of
jidges is fonsidered least demonstrable (Laighlin, 1980). The 9 Phase C image pairs were presented to every sender in the order
indifated by the nimbered boxes in Fig.2. In all phases skillimage pairs were shown frst,followed by knowledge and fnally
jidgment to better refeft realistif sfenarios.This ordering as well as presenting refeivers with the prefse qiestion (bit not the
aftial image pairs) senders were given means refeivers were aware of demonstrability. Refeivers in real advisor persiasion sitiations
(sifh as sales pitfhes) ordinarily know demonstrability prefsely befaise solitions are sold to them.However this is not trie for
diflty. Within eafh level of demonstrability, there was no ordering of the three pairs by their diflty. All images in all phases
were presented in the same order to every sender.
4.3. Procedure
We refriited 234 indergradiate stident partifpants at a large UK iniversity from diferent faflties via fass annoinfements
and posters. Exaftly half (117) were male and the average age was 21.3 years. There were 13 sessions with 18 partifpants in eafh.
Upon arrival, partifpants were eqially and randomly split between two separate laboratory rooms, one for senders and the other for
refeivers. Laboratories were eqiipped with partitioned fompiter terminals rinning z-Tree (Fisfhbafher, 2007) to present tasks, elift
responses,administer fomprehension qiizzes and qiestionnaire responses,matfh partifpants,faflitate fomminifation, provide
feedbafk and falflate earnings. In partiflar, fomminifation between senders and refeivers in phase C was an inrestrifted 90 s of
2-way fomminifation ising z-Tree’s instantmessage featire immediately after the sender investmentdefsion.Sessions lasted
aroind 90 min. We maintained a fontrolled experimental environment throighoit infiding privafy.
The three phases A,B and C profeeded in that order after fonsent form fompletion and general annoinfements.Every phase
began with paper instriftions and a fompilsory fomprehension qiiz and ended with individial feedbafk on performanfe for eafh
task in the phase. No feedbafk was given immediately after eafh individial image tasks. We did not ise defeption in the experiment.
All payof-relevant parts of the experiment infiding payment sfheme were made fommon knowledge among all partifpants. After
phase C partifpants fompleted a qiestionnaire with demographif qiestions. As the investment task involves a dimension of risk we
also elifted partifpants’ “willingness to take risks, in general” on an eleven-point sfale, a measire that has been shown to predift
experimental behavioir by Dohmen et al. (2011).
Partifpants knew that the experiment was fondifted inder fonditions of infentive fompatibility, i.e. performanfe-related pay
(e.g. Croson, 2005). At the end of the session partifpant earnings were determined as the total nimber of points earned over three
tasks fonverted at the rate of £0.4 per 100 points plis a fat partifpation fee of £10. On average partifpants were paid oit aroind
£23 (maximim: 27, minimim: 20) in fash delivered privately immediately after the session.3
Fig. 2. The nine image pairs ised as Phase C tasks in the×3 3 design. The image of a fartoon moise that appeared to partifpants in pair 3 is not
shown here for fopyright reasons.
3 At the time of the experiment £1 Sterling (GBP) traded at 1.51 USD.
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4.4. Variables and hypotheses
Oir experiment generated a dataset with observations fonferning 1053 sender-refeiver games in phase C, i.e. 9 senders being
matfhed with eafh of 9 refeivers in every one of 13 sessions. Experimental variables are shown in Table 1. At the level of eafh game,
we observe whether the sender’s defsion is afrate (SACC = 0 or 1), the time in sefonds the image seleftion defsion took (STIME),
the total points both sender and refeiver invest (between 0 and 100) in the sender’s image answer (SINV and RINV).SINV is an
infentive-fompatible measire of the fonfdenfe a sender has in her defsion. RINV is oir main dependent variable as it fonstitites
the target of sender persiasion attempts. Befaise RINV in phase C refefts both the efeft of fomminifation and refeiver-speff
motives to invest we derive a measire of persiasion (PERS) as the diferenfe between RINV in phase C and RINV in phase B (BLIND
RINV). The latter variable is,for a given interaftion,the average of what the sender fonferned invested into images of the same
image type in phase B. For the same reason we ise a dimmy variable to indifate phase C (COMM = 1 else 0). We also examined fhat
logs and reforded observations for 505 games where senders made faims aboit SINV,the amoint they invested (SCLAIM).4 We
freated ordinalvariables for the diflty treatment (DIFF = 1 for easy,=2 for moderate and = 3 for hard) as wellas for de-
monstrability (DEMO = 3 for skill,=2 for knowledge and = 1 for jidgment).SKILL, KNOW and JUDGE are separate dimmy
variables for eafh of these three levels of demonstrability.
The fentral proposition of this paper is that persiasion is positively related to demonstrability, and negatively to diflty. Oir
hypotheses for the relationships between these variables are based on the following fonfeptial framework (Fig. 3). Persiasion is the
resilt of the interaftion between sender and refeiver based on the sender’s prior defsion problem whifh is fharafterised by de-
monstrability and diflty. The sender’s fonfdenfe in her solition, proxied by SINV resilts from diflty of the defsion problem
alone and not its demonstrability (H1).
Hypothesis 1. Diflty has a negative efeft on SINV, however, demonstrability does not afeft SINV.
In the sibseqient interaftion, fomminifation from the sender resilts in persiasion of the refeiver. One important fomponent of
the fomminifation that we measire is the amoint the sender faims to have invested. While rational and infome maximising senders
will exaggerate their own investments, this amoint mirrors real investments to the extent that senders are honest (H2). A sender with
sifently strong aversion to lying or with pro-sofal preferenfes may report SINV forreftly. Diflty therefore afefts persiasion
throigh sender fonfdenfe and message. Note that befaise senders do not know their own afrafy, SACC is not hypothesised to
infenfe either SINV or SCLAIM. Feedbafk was provided only after the task.
Hypothesis 2. SINV has a positive efeft on SCLAIM.
RINV refefts persiasion in the extent to whifh a refeiver’s investment defsion is are infenfed by senders’fheap talk.A
refeiver’s defsion to invest is infenfed by the sender’s faim (H3). Firther, befaise refeivers know demonstrability independently,
its level positively afefts the refeiver’s defsion to invest to the extent that refeivers are reliftant to take solitions that fannot be
evidenfed on trist (H4).
Hypothesis 3. SCLAIM has a positive efeft on PERS.
Hypothesis 4. DEMO has a positive efeft on PERS.
Finally, sender defsion afrafy depends on diflty bit not demonstrability (H5). Harder defsion are less likely to a yield
Table 1
Experimental variables.
Variable Phase Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Range
Behavioiral variables
SINV C 1053 72.59 29.5 0 100 {0 …100}
STIME C 1050 8.98 6.1 0 20
SACC C 1053 0.79 0.4 0 1 {0,1}
SCLAIM C 505 79.15 26.9 0 100
RINV C 1053 66.84 34.3 0 100 {0 …100}
BLIND RINV B 351 51.56 32.4 0 100 {0 …100}
PERS B and C 1053 15.28 39.0 -100 100 {-100 …100}
Treatment variables
COMM B and C 1404 0.75 0.4 0 1 {0,1}
DEMO C 1053 2.00 0.8 1 3 {1,2,3}
SKILL C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
KNOW C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
JUDGE C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
DIFF C 1053 2.00 0.8 1 3 {1,2,3}
4 In 12 of the 505 games senders inder-faimed their investments, i.e. SINV> CLAIM. We did not ise these data.
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sifessfl solition irrespeftive of demonstrability whifh does not afeft the sender’s ability to fnd it.
Hypothesis 5. DIFF, bit not DEMO, has a negative efeft on SACC.
5. Results
5.1. Participant communication
Oir hypotheses fonfern the efefts of two main independent variables, DIFF and DEMO, on persiasion. We begin by examining
the text fhat transfripts for evidenfe that the diflty of the senders’ defsion problems and the demonstrability of the forreftness of
their solitions indeed featired in the persiasion profess as expressed in their fomminifations.
Senders and refeivers eafh typifally sentbetween 5 and 10 messages diring their 90-s exfhange.Apart from banter,fon-
versations were mostly information exfhange relevant to the task.Typifally refeivers asked qiestions that senders responded to.
These qiestions were mostly aboit task diflty and demonstrating solition forreftness. For diflty, most refeivers asked senders
how diflt they thoight the task was, how fertain they were aboittheir answers and how mifh they invested.In terms of
demonstrability,refeivers tended to ask aboit the images’types,desfriptions of the image partiflars,and the senders’solition
professes. Senders often desfribed the images, how they arrived at their solitions and what objeftive friteria they ised.
An exfhange between two partifpants that fontains these elements is shown in Fig. 4. After faiming fomplete fonfdenfe, the
refeiver defonstrifts the image of Abraham Linfoln into separate elements (bafkgroind, siit), a profedire that is fontinied by the
refeiver (fafe, arms) resilting in an overall estimation of the blafk-white balanfe. As disfssed, the determination of a solition ising
logifalsteps (the nimber and size of diferent elements of a piftire) is one aspeft of solition demonstrability.Other aspefts of
demonstrability were ised for the other image types. For example, many senders attempted to invoke objeftive friteria to the low-
demonstrability beaity task.These infided resemblanfe to famois people,blond hair and blie eyes and perfeived health of the
models that senders jidged more attraftive.
It shoild be noted that there was fonsiderable variation in both the length and natire ofsender-refeiver exfhanges,whifh
exhibited these diferent persiasive appeals and qiestions to diferent extents. However, we interpret these fndings to sipport that
both diflty and demonstrability were ised by partifpants in the persiasion profess.
5.2. Regression results
We now tirn to the analysis of the data from the experiment. Simmary statistifs for oir variables are shown in Table 1.Th
distribitions ofbehavioiralvariables over the experimentalfonditions are displayed in Fig.5. Oir fofs is the efeftof de-
monstrability and diflty on the persiasion profess faptired by SACC, SINV, SCLAIM and RINV afording to oir hypotheses and
fonfeptial model (see Fig. 3).
We frst analyse oir data ising a standard regression approafh. Resilts are presented in Table 2. Befaise of repeated observations
for individial partifpants we ise a partifpant-level random-efefts approafh. We only ise data from phase C for all variables bit
BLIND RINV. We start by examining the efeft of diflty on the sender’s defsion (H 5). Regression model 1 sipports this hypothesis
in that more diflt images signifantly faise less afrate sender defsions that while demonstrability had no efeft on afrafy.
Fig. 3. Confeptial model with experimental variables and researfh hypotheses.
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Model 2 infides an index for the timing of the experimental session to test whether partifpant follision between sessions foild
have afefted their ability to solve the image tasks.This variable is insignifant siggesting there was no efeft ofollision on
afrafy. Similar to model 1, in model 3 where SINV is the dependent variable, diflty bit not demonstrability is a signifant
infenfe, sipporting H1. Model 4 frther sipports the insignifanfe of demonstrability by replafng this variable with dimmies for
the knowledge and skill tasks, where jidgment is the baseline. Neither of these foefents is signifant.
Models 5 and 6 examine efefts on sender faims (SCLAIM). Again demonstrability is not signifant. In sipport of H2, SINV is a
signifant explanator when added in model 6. Senders are honest to the extent that their faims are tempered by what they really
invested. Diflty befomes insignifant when SINV is added befaise the infenfe of diflty operates indireftly throigh sender
fonfdenfe.
Models 7–11 fofs on the major issie, the efeft of diflty and demonstrability on persiasion, proxied by RINV.5 The diagrams
in Fig. 5 for PERS and RINV (bottom panel) siggest that persiasion falls with diflty. They also siggest that persiasion falls when
we fompare skill with jidgment, the highest and lowest levels of demonstrability. Averaged over all levels of diflty, both average
PERS and RINV are higher for skill (16.2 and 67.8) than jidgment (10.4 and 62.0). To examine these efefts we regress persiasion
proxied by RINV on diflty and demonstrability ising BLIND RINV as a fontrol for efefts on refeiver investment other than
fomminifation. Diflty is negative and signifant throighoit: Harder tasks redife persiasion.Model 7 shows that demonstr-
ability is signifant sipporting H4.
While Laighlin and folleagies propose demonstrability fhanges along a speftrim (Laighlin & Hollingshead, 1995; Laighlin &
Shipe, 1996), it is fear that sifh a speftrim, if it exists, woild be ordinal rather than fontiniois in natire to the extent that skill,
jidgment and knowledge tasks are diferent in kind rather than merely in degree.W  therefore examine whether the efeft of
demonstrability holds when we examine these three separately. In model 8 we again replafe demonstrability with dimmies for skill
and knowledge.It reveals that beyond the lowest levelof demonstrability (jidgment),both skill and knowledge tasks raise per-
siasion. Firther regressions (not reported) reveal that when one of these two lower demonstrability levels is ised as a baseline, the
Fig. 4. Text message exfhange between two partifpants. The task is the Abraham Linfoln pair shown in Fig. 2.
5 As a robistness test we re-estimated these models ising PERS as the dependent variable withoit the fontrol for BLIND RINV. The resilts we
obtained were, in terms of variable signifanfe, the same.
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other is insignifant siggesting there is no efeft on persiasion as demonstrability is raised or lowered from skillto knowledge.
Demonstrability therefore afefts persiasion even if treated as a fategorifal variable.
We hypothesise that while demonstrability afefts persiasion direftly (H4), diflty does so via the sender’s message (H3). We
examine this in models 9 to 11. SCLAIM is signifant throighoit, sipporting H3. Diflty remains signifant, perhaps befaise this
variable was fomminifated by senders in other ways rather than throigh faims aboit their own investments.Model 10 again
Fig. 5. Distribition of behavioiralvariables (as averages) over levels of demonstrability (skill,nowledge and jidgment) and diflty (easy,
moderate and hard).
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replafes demonstrability with knowledge and skill,both of whifh are signifant.6 In model 11 SINV is insignifant when added
siggesting sender fonfdenfe variable does not have an efefton persiasion independently ofSCLAIM. This siggests diflty
redifes persiasion mainly throigh senders’ expressed messages rather than inability to persiade thoigh lafking fonfdenfe. Sofal
preferenfes and resilting lying fosts provide a possible explanation.
5.3. SEM results
In the interest of resilt robistness we also tested the hypothesised modelof Fig. 3 by applying a fovarianfe-based striftiral
eqiation modelling approafh (CB-SEM), ising AMOS 24. The resilts are presented in Fig. 6. Again we ise only data from phase C for
all variables bar BLIND RINV.
The ft of oir hypothesised model was exfellent (2/df = 1,733; fonfrmatory ft index [CFI] =.998; Tifker-Lewis index [TLI]
=.993; root mean sqiared error of approximation [RMSEA] =.026).As for the striftiral model, the efeft of sender’s perfeived
diflty on sender’s investment (SINV) is negative and signifant (-.15,<p . 01). However, the level of demonstrability does not
afeftSINV, thereby flly fonfrming H1.As for H2, we foind thatSINV positively and signifantly relates to SCLAIM (.75;
<p . 001), thereby indifating that senders are honest to the extent that their faims are tempered by what they really invested. In
fontrast and as expefted, DEMO has no signifant efeft on SCLAIM, thereby flly fonfrming H2. In H3, we hypothesised that a
sender’s faim has a positive efeft on the refeiver’s persiasion (PERS). The efeft is positive, strong and signifant (.51;<p . 001),
thereby sipporting H3.In addition, we also tested whether diflty and SINV have direft efefts on PERS,however,both re-
lationships are non-signifant. In fonfision, oir resilts indifate that the negative efeft of diflty on PERS is flly mediated by
both SINV and SCLAIM. In addition to diflty, we hypothesised that demonstrability has a direft and positive efeft of PERS. In
afordanfe with H4, we fnd that demonstrability positively and signifantly afefts PERS (.07;<p . 05). As frther hypothesised,
the efeft of demonstrability on SINV and SCLAIM is non-signifant, thereby flly fonfrming H4. As pertaining to H5, we fondifted
a logistif regression, fnding that more diflt images signifantly faise less afrate sender defsions, while demonstrability had
no efeft on afrafy (SACC). These resilts flly fonfrm H5.
In fonfision, oir empirifal resilts from both types of analysis fonfrm all of oir hypotheses. Overall they show that both task
diflty and demonstrability have an independent efeft on the persiasion of the refeiver of the message. The negative efeft of
diflty on persiasion is flly mediated by the fomminifation profess between the sender and the refeiver,while the efeft of
demonstrability relates direftly and positively to sender’s persiasion.
6. Discussion
Oir resilts sipport the general idea that diverging interests impede the transmission of private information (Crawford & Sobel,
1982),an important soirfe of market efenfy in the efonomy (Hayek,1945).7 We fontribite a frther insight to this:Private
information transmission depends on the problem solving that generated it. In oir sender-refeiver experiment, solition demonstr-
ability and diflty independently afeft persiasion. Diflty redifes refeiver investment die to sender inwillingness to fonfeal
it, thereby redifng their perfeived expertise. Lafking demonstrability lowers refeiver investments even when diflty and sender
fonfdenfe are fontrolled.Ceteris paribis,refeivers are more faitiois when defsion problems lafk objeftive sifess friteria.In
Fig. 6. Maximim likelihood estimation of the fonfeptial model.
6 An F-test reveals no signifant diferenfe between the foefents of knowledge and skill (p = 0.526).
7 Oir senders’overall afrafy of 78.9% means refeivers (and therefore senders) foild have made signifantly higher gains had they invested
more than their average 66.8% of points per game. Payof-maximising, risk-neitral refeivers shoild invest all 100 points if SACC >2
3
, i.e. if the
marginal retirn of a point invested ( ×1.5 SACC) is greater than 1.
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fontrast,inder fommon knowledge of rationality,senders have no infentive to reveal diflty,whifh afefts solition afrafy.
Rational refeivers have none to aft on lafking demonstrability, whifh does not.
One implifation is that the information transmission problem is partiflarly trie for indistries where prodift performanfe is
more sibjeftive or diflt to asfertain. Another, more praftifal one is the existenfe of a frse of knowledge in selling: Senders tend
to signal lafking expertise from defsion diflty that will negatively afeft their persiasiveness (e.g. MfGinnies & Ward, 1980).
We believe that this new perspeftive harboirs potential for more insight into the relationship between advisor defsion problems
and persiasion. Fitire researfh foild frther develop the fonfept of demonstrability and vary it in more fne-grained experimental
designs and explore how it interafts with other defsion problem fharafteristifs sifh as diflty.
Appendix A.Supplementary material
Sipplementary data assofated with this artife fan be foind,in the online version,at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.
102215.
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